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What's Entertainment? An Inquiry into
the Educational and Amusing Aspects
of Educational Play Parks
By JENNIFER J. MARTIN*
I
Introduction
The operation of amusement parks is now a billion dollar in-
dustry in the United States.' In 1982 alone, more people visited
amusement parks than attended all major professional sports
games combined.2 The most familiar of these recreational cen-
ters are the forty-four major theme parks which draw people
from all over the nation and indeed, from all parts of the world.
They include Disneyland, Disneyworld, Sea World, Dark Con-
tinent, Knotts Berry Farm, Hershey's, and Great Adventure.
Most of the thousands of amusement parks scattered across
the country are traditional parks featuring a variety of rides
and shows.3 While these facilities offer an entire spectrum of
fun, all are equipped with the traditional amusement park fare:
thrill rides such as roller coasters, ferris wheels, and flume
rides, and a variety of live and animated shows.
Recently, as the number of possible locations for other large
* Member, Third Year Class; B.A. 1980 Scripps College.
The author wishes to acknowledge the valuable assistance of Dean Stephen
Schwarz, Hastings College of the Law, and Mr. Karol Wyatt Kersh and Mr. Steven R.
Huff of the law offices of Karol Wyatt Kersh and Associates, Salem, Oregon.
1. Hellman, Those Incredible New Amusement Parks. A Taste of Thrills to Come!
FUTURIST, August 1980, at 43.
2. Id. at 38.
3. The [amusement] park business really began [in this country] in the late
1800's, some of the earliest ones around 1875, 1876, primarily midwestern cities,
like St. Louis and Chicago. Through the end of the 1900 [sic] century, there
were in fact over a thousand amusement parks in America and by the turn of
the century, 1900.
Mr. William Monty, General Manager of Sesame Place. Township of Middletown v.
Sesame Place, Inc., No. 80-8804-11-1, and Sesame Place, Inc. v. Township of Mid-
dletown, No. 80-8816-11-1 (Ct. Com. Pleas, Bucks County, Pa. (1980)). (combined ac-
tion) [hereinafter cited as Middletown v. Sesame Place, Inc. ]. Record of Declaratory
Judgment Hearing, at 235.
COMM/ENT L. J.
facilities near major metropolitan areas grows scarce and the
cost of building and operating large ride equipment escalates, a
new type of theme park is emerging. The model of the future is
a much smaller park that does not offer traditional passive en-
tertainment. Designed for families with children aged three to
thirteen, it offers participatory science exhibits, computer
games, and play elements.
The prototype for this innovative blend of education and en-
tertainment is Sesame Place, a joint venture of Children's Tel-
evision Workshop4 and Busch Entertainment Corporation.'
The two organizations joined their talents and resources to de-
sign a small "educational play park" dependent on repeated
visits from a local community rather than on visitors from all
over the nation. Sesame Place is located in Langhorne, Penn-
sylvania, on fifteen acres of land6 adjacent to a large shopping
mall.7 The park is a thirty minute drive from Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania, fifteen minutes from Trenton, New Jersey, and
less than two hours from New York City, New York.
The financial viability of the park's self-proclaimed blend of
education and entertainment8 became apparent early in its
first season. Sesame Place opened its doors July 30, 1980, and
in its first week of operation the gross receipts of the facility
exceeded $900,000, nearly ten percent of the initial investment.9
Throughout the summer, the park was forced to turn away ten
thousand people on a daily basis to prevent overcrowding.1"
4. Children's Television Workshop operates worldwide, producing nonprofit edu-
cational television programs for children, as well as revenue generating ventures in a
variety of businesses. The for-profit ventures engaged in by Children's Television
Workshop (CTW) all produce funds which are used to finance the creation, develop-
ment and production of the nonprofit educational television programs. The television
programs produced by CTW, "Sesame Street," "The Electric Company" and "3-2-1
Contact" teach intellectual, social and emotional skills and concepts to children. Ses-
ame Place News (1982) (press kit, available from Sesame Place, Inc.).
5. Busch Entertainment Corporation is the family entertainment subsidiary of
Anheuser-Busch Companies, Inc. The company owns and operates two successful
large theme parks, The Dark Continent, Busch Gardens in Tampa, Florida, and The
Old Country, Busch Gardens in Williamsburg, Virginia. Id.
6. Only three and one-half acres actually house the attraction. The remaining
eleven and one-half acres are used for parking space. Id.
7. Sesame Place is located next to Oxford Valley Mall in Lower Bucks County,
Pennsylvania.
8. The motto of the educational play park is: "Sesame Place - where learning is
half the fun!" Sesame Place News, supra note 4.
9. McMillan's personal dream: Design totally his own park, Amusement Busi-
ness, December 1980, at 5, col. 1.
10. Id.
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Sesame Place's success has attracted the attention of the
business community and of educators nationwide." Educators
are interested in the concept of an educational play park as
well as the special educational programs offered by the facility
for school field trips. The park's obvious potential for profit at-
tracts investors interested in developing similar projects. The
profit-making aspect of the operation intrigues municipalities
and states; many have already enacted statutes providing for
the collection of taxes on admissions to amusement facilities. 12
This note addresses an issue of interest to the educator, the
investor and the local or state tax assessor-whether the edu-
cational play park should be considered an educational facility
or an amusement park for state and local amusement tax pur-
poses. The dispute between Sesame Street, Inc. and the town-
ship of Middletown serves as a vivid example of the
inadequacies of present descriptive tests used to define the
terms "education" and "amusement."'3 The sole issue in the
11. The demonstrated financial viability of Sesame Place has led a number of busi-
ness professionals in the amusement business to predict a growing trend toward simi-
lar educational play developments. Sesame Place, Inc. recognizes and leads this
growth. A second Sesame Place opened in the Dallas/Fort Worth Metroplex in Irving,
Texas, on June 18, 1982, and more operations are planned in locations scattered
throughout the nation. Many speculators feel that competition providing similar facili-
ties will not lag far behind.
One important factor in the rapidity of development is the lower cost of operation of
an educational play park. According to W. Randolph Baker, president of Busch En-
tertainment Corporation:
The $9 million cost of creating the park, minus "several million dollars" in one-
time research and development expenditures, is comparable to what develop-
ers normally spend building a single roller coaster ride in more elaborate
parks ....
And lacking the complex mechanical equipment, Sesame Place also avoids
its expensive maintenance. All this means profit for the developers, who, if
their projection of one million visitors annually is correct, might recoup their
investment within a few years.
Sesame Street Inspires A Park, New York Times, July 31, 1980, §3, at 1, cols. 2-3.
12. Among the municipalities with such statutes are: Township of Middletown,
Pennsylvania, Resolution No. 67-6R (amended 1967); New York City, New York, Tax
Law art. 28, §1101 subd.(d), paras. (2), (10), §1105 subd.(h), para.(1). Administrative
Code of the City of New York, §A46-1.0 et seq.; Township of Cicero, Illinois, Act. 79-1185.
States with representative amusement tax laws include: Alabama, Ala. Code §51-
786(3) (B) (Supp. 1965); Arizona, Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. 42-1314 (amended 1980); and
Kansas, Kan. Stat. Ann. §79-3603 (Supp. 1970).
13. The township of Middletown and Sesame Place, Inc. filed cross-actions for de-
claratory judgments following the successful opening of the park.
As this note reached publication COMM/ENT learned that the attorneys for Sesame
Place, Inc. and the township of Middletown reached a settlement agreement. The set-
tlement was reached after oral arguments were presented to the Pennsylvania Court
COMM/ENT L. J.
legal battle between the educational play park and the town-
ship was whether the park should be subject to tax as an
"amusement". Since the park's opening in July 1980, Sesame
Place, Inc. had refused to pay the township's ten percent
amusement admissions tax. 4 The park maintained that the fa-
cility was an educational center and not an amusement park.
The township asserted that the facility was an amusement
park subject to the township's amusement tax.
This note examines definitions of the terms "amusement"
and "education." It considers the definition of "educational,"
set out in Treasury Regulation 1.501(c) (3), which was held to
be unconstitutionally vague in Big Mama Rag, Inc. v. United
States .5
While literal application of the broad interpretation of
"amusement" under the local tax statute in Middletown v. Ses-
ame Place, Inc. indicates that Sesame Place should be consid-
ered an amusement park for the purpose of taxing admissions,
examination of cases involving comparable facilities, such as
educational day care centers, 6 reveals that these facilities
have been classified as primarily educational in nature.
This note proposes that educational facilities should not be
taxed as amusement centers, and that the development of new
objective definitional standards for the terms "education" and
"amusement" is both desirable and long overdue. It concludes
by suggesting some possible standards, developed from case
law and popular perception, which would be more appropriate
for innovative corporate concepts such as Sesame Place.
II
The Need for an Objective Definitional Approach
in Classifying Facilities
The ultimate determination of the applicability of any of the
municipal or state statutes imposing an admissions tax upon
of Appeals in early May. Sesame Place, Inc. agreed to the application of the amuse-
ment tax. Cf. Amusement Business, June 4, 1983, at 16, cols. 1-3.
14. The educational play park collected the ten percent amusement tax from pa-
trons and placed the money in an escrow account until the issue would be decided.
The money so collected in 1980 remained in the escrow account. However, because of
township budget difficulties in 1981 and 1982, the facility passed on for the township's
use the sum of $300,000 collected as disputed amusement taxes during 1981 and 1982.
Id.
15. 631 F.2d 1030 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
16. See infra notes 79-85.
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any given facility depends upon the precise wording and un-
derlying purpose of the statute, as well as the nature of the
facility.
While this determination in regard to a particular educa-
tional play park may be a minor matter, the questions posed by
such cases present controversial issues of great importance.
As Supreme Court Justice Douglas stated, "[t] he power to tax
the exercise of a privilege is the power to control or suppress
its enjoyment."' 7 Because the power to tax educational organi-
zations and amusement facilities often rests upon vague and
subjective definitions which may be subject to arbitrary or dis-
criminatory enforcement, there is a need for a clear defini-
tional approach.
A. What's "Amusement"?
In the dispute between Sesame Place and the township of
Middletown, 8 the sole question presented for determination
by the appellate court was whether the trial court erred in find-
ing that the facility was an amusement operation under the
meaning of the township's Taxing Resolution or the Local Tax
Enabling Act. The Local Tax Enabling Act does not define
''amusement" or "place of amusement." The township's
Amusement Tax Resolution defines amusement very broadly
as:
All Manner [sic] and form of entertainment, including, among
others, theatrical or operatic performances, concerts, vaude-
villes, circus, carnival and side shows, all forms of entertain-
ment at fair grounds and amusement parks, athletic contests,
including wrestling matches, boxing, and sparring, swimming,
archery, shooting, riding, dancing, rowing, billiards, pool and all
other forms of diversions, sport recreation or pastime, shows,
exhibitions, contests, displays, and games and all other meth-
ods of obtaining admission charges, donations, contributions or
monetary charges of any character, from the general public, or
17. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 112 (1943). In an often quoted passage
of an earlier case, Mr. Justice Marshall stated:
That the power to tax involves the power to destroy; that the power to destroy
may defeat and render useless the power to create; that there is a plain repug-
nance, in conferring on one government a power to control the constitutional
measures of another, which other, with respect to those very measures is de-
clared to be supreme over that which exerts the control, are propositions not
to be denied.
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 413 (1819).
18. Middletown v. Sesame Place, Inc.
No. 4]
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a limited or selected number thereof, directly or indirectly, in
return for other than tangible property, or specific personal or
professional services. 9
Interestingly enough, another section of the resolution pro-
vides an exemption for religious, educational, and charitable
institutions, societies, or organizations, which is very similar to
the exemption provided in Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.) sec-
tion 501(c) (3).2
At trial, Sesame Place, Inc. did not contend that Sesame
Place or any part of it was exempt from the amusement tax as
a nonprofit educational organization.21 Rather, the corporation
argued that the educational play park did not come within the
scope of the statute because it is not an amusement park and is
not similar in nature to the other forms of entertainment listed
in the resolution.22
In his decision, the trial court judge noted that there is no
exception in the taxing resolution for educational activities
(other than the exemption for nonprofit educational organiza-
tions). The judge reasoned that "(t)he question is not whether
the activity at Sesame Place is educational, but whether it is
not amusement as gauged by a definition supplied either by
the Dictionary or the Resolution or both. 23 He found that
"(w)hat they sell at Sesame Place is PLAY' 24 and that, con-
trary to the facility's motto, "(1) earning at Sesame is no part of
the fun. ' 25 The judge concluded that the play park constituted
an amusement under the statute.
19. Township of Middletown, Pennsylvania, Resolution No. 67-6R §1 (amended
1967).
20. See infra note 40 for I.R.C. §501(c)(3). Section 12(a)(1) reads as follows:
SECTION 12. (a) The tax imposed by this Resolution shall not apply to, or be
imposed upon, the privilege to attend any amusement the proceeds of which,
after payment of reasonable expenses, inure:
(1) Exclusively to the benefit of religious, educational, and charitable institu-
tions, societies, or organizations, provided, that no part of the net earnings in-
ure to the benefit of any private shareholder or person.
The inclusion of such a provision gives some indication that the drafters of the resolu-
tion did not believe that educational facilities should be taxed as amusement
attractions.
21. Sesame Place, Inc. abandoned its initial contention that if the tax was found to
be applicable, it applied only to one half of the admissions as fifty percent of the reve-
nues generated inured to the benefit of a nonprofit organization. Middletown v. Ses-
ame Place, Inc., Decision and Decree Nisi, at 8. (Dec. 23, 1980).
22. Id. at 3.
23. Id. at 12.
24. Id. at 13.
25. Id. at 17.
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On appeal, Sesame Place, Inc. assigned as error the trial
court's determination that, as a matter of fact, the educational
play park is an amusement facility. Sesame Place, Inc. as-
serted that the trial court erred in its conclusion that the ap-
propriate standard to apply to the facility was whether the
park was in any degree entertaining rather than primarily en-
tertaining or primarily educational in nature. Sesame Place,
Inc. contended that the pertinent question for determination
under the resolution was whether the facility is primarily an
amusement operation and by nature one of the class of entities
listed in the statute, not merely whether the facility is inciden-
tally an amusement attraction. The court concluded that the
resolution meant to tax amusement facilities irrespective of
their educational value. However, careful reading of the tax or-
dinance gives no indication that this was the township's pur-
pose. As noted above,26 the statute specifically exempts from
coverage nonprofit educational facilities. To that extent, at
least, the township recognized some distinction between edu-
cational facilities and an entity operated purely for fun and
profit.
Sesame Place, Inc. contended that the primary purpose of a
facility should determine the applicability of an amusement
tax under Pennsylvania law. "Thus, if a trip to Sesame Place
provides primarily a developmental or educational experience
for a child it must be concluded that Sesame Place, Inc. is not
required to collect a tax on admissions under the Township's
Taxing resolution. '27 Pennsylvania case law supports this po-
sition. Several cases have specifically held that facilities which
are primarily educational in nature and incidentally entertain-
ing are not subject to an amusement tax.28
Sesame Place, Inc. specifically argued that the use of a series
of objective factors culled from the leading case in the area,
Derry Township v. Swartz,29 demonstrated this point. Swartz
dealt with the application of an amusement admissions tax on
the operation of the Indian Echo Caverns, a local attraction of
"historical, natural and geological dimensions."3 The appel-
late court affirmed the trial court's determination that the cen-
26. See text accompanying note 20.
27. Middletown v. Sesame Place, Inc., Argument Brief for Sesame Place, Inc., at 11.
28. See infra text accompanying notes 82-91.
29. 97 Dauph. 106, affid, 21 Pa. Commw. 587 (1975).
30. Derry Township v. Swartz, 21 Pa. Commw. at 589.
No. 4]
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tral issue in resolving whether admission to a particular
attraction is subject to an amusement tax is whether the facil-
ity's primary purpose is to "provide an educational experience,
although admittedly resulting in some enjoyment or pleasure"
or simply "to have fun." After analyzing the nature of the In-
dian Echo Caverns, the trial and appellate court judges both
concluded that the caverns were located in a "unique environ-
ment unlike anything found on the surface of the earth."'"
The trial court in Swartz attached some importance to the
fact that visitors to the caverns were guided by individuals who
are knowledgeable and familiar with the formation, structure,
natural history, age, and other relevant facts of the attraction. 2
The court also heard evidence that educators considered a visit
to the Indian Echo Caverns an educational experience of some
significance.33
B. What's "Education"?
To reach the conclusion that Sesame Place is primarily an
educational facility and only incidentally an amusement
center, it is first necessary to examine the definitional ap-
proach to the term "educational." The continuing definitional
troubles posed by the word "educational" in the Federal Inter-
nal Revenue Code Regulations serve as examples of the kinds
of concerns involved in the interpretation and application of
the term.
31. Middletown v. Sesame Place, Inc., Argument Brief for Sesame Place, Inc. at 12.
In a different way, Sesame Place is designed to provide a unique environment:
Our broad claim is that the total environment here creates and enhances the
development of a child .... Sesame Place consists of a number of elements
common to museums, computer centers and playgrounds. What is unique is
that these elements have been combined "in a planned environment designed
to create a certain kind of developmental experience for the child.
Id. at 13.
32. Sesame Place, Inc. employs over two hundred high school and college students
to serve as guides and encouragers for the park's visitors. All attendants participate in
a training program where they learn the history of the park and its developmental
goals, the design and operation of all the exhibits, and how to interact with the park's
visitors. An integral part of the operational philosophy of Sesame Place, Inc. is to pro-
vide answers to any questions posed by visitors to the attendants or the management
personnel. Middletown v. Sesame Place, Inc., Record at 268-75.
33. Swartz, 97 Dauph. at 107. Sesame Place offers a variety of special formalized
packages for use by teachers in preparing classes for a field trip to the park and to aid
them in expanding upon the selected theme in the classroom after the visit to the park.
During the first fall season of operation over 13,000 school children visited the park on
school field trips. Middletown v. Sesame Place, Inc., Record at 265.
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The United States has a consistent historical policy of ex-
empting nonprofit educational organizations from federal in-
come taxation.34 An exemption for such entities is provided in
the Income Tax Law of 1894, 31 the United States Corporate Ex-
cise Tax Law of 1909,36 the United States Income Tax Law of
1913,3 the Internal Revenue Code of 193938 and most recently
in the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.39
Section 501(c) (3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 enu-
merates a variety of exempt entities, including nonprofit edu-
cational organizations. 4° Congress did not define the word
"educational" in the statute. The Secretary of the Treasury,
and more directly the Commissioner of Internal Revenue have
the task of defining and interpreting the term.41 Congress di-
rects the Secretary of the Treasury Department to "prescribe
all needful rules and regulations for the enforcement"' of the
34. There have been only minor variations in the coverage of the exemption and in
the definition and application of the term "educational" throughout the statute's vari-
ous enactments. See texts of statutes cited in notes 35-39, infra.
35. Act. of Aug. 27, 1894, ch. 349, §32, 28 Stat. 556.
36. Act of Aug. 5, 1909, ch. 6, §38, 36 Stat. 112, 113.
37. Act of Oct. 3, 1913, ch. 16, §2(G), 38 Stat. 114, 172.
38. Internal Revenue Code of 1939, ch. 1, §101(6).
39. Internal Revenue Code of 1954, §501(c) (3), 68A stat. 3, 163.
40. The exempt entities enumerated in I.R.C. §501(c) (3) are as follows:
Corporations, and any community chest, fund, or foundation, organized and
operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public
safety, literary, or educational purposes, or for the prevention of cruelty to
children or animals, no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit
of any private shareholder or individual, no substantial part of the activities of
which is carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to influence legisla-
tion, and which does not participate in, or intervene in (including the publish-
ing or distributing of statements), any political campaign on behalf of any
candidate for public office.
Id.
41. See National Muffler Dealers Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 440 U.S. 472 (1979):
In such a situation, this Court customarily defers to the regulation, which, "if
found to 'implement the congressional mandate in some reasonable manner,'
must be upheld."
We do this because "Congress has delegated to the [Secretary of the Treas-
ury and his delegate, the] Commissioner [of Internal Revenue], not to the
courts, the task of prescribing 'all needful rules and regulations for the en-
forcement' of the Internal Revenue Code .... That delegation helps ensure
that in "this area of limitless factual variations"... like cases will be treated
alike. It also helps guarantee that the rules will be written by "masters of the
subject". . . who will be responsible for putting the rules into effect.
Id. at 476. See also Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 29 (1976): "As
the Code does not define the term 'charitable,' the status of each nonprofit hospital is
determined on a case-by-case basis by the IRS."
42. 26 U.S.C. 7805(a) (1976).
COMM/ENT L. J.
Internal Revenue Code of 1954. Accordingly, the Treasury
promulgated the definition of "educational" in Regulation
1.501(c) (3)-1(d) (3) which construes the term as follows:
(3) Educational defined-(i) In general. The term "educa-
tional", as used in section 501(c) (3), relates to-
(a) The instruction or training of the individual for the
purpose of improving or developing his capabilities; or
(b) The instruction of the public on subjects useful to the
individual and beneficial to the community.
An organization may be educational even though it advocates a
particular position or viewpoint so long as it presents a suffi-
ciently full and fair exposition of the pertinent facts as to per-
mit an individual or the public to form an independent opinion
or conclusion. On the other hand, an organization is not educa-
tional if its principal function is the mere presentation of un-
supported opinion.43
While the general definition has not altered significantly since
1894," the "full and fair exposition" test first appeared in the
Treasury Regulations of 1959.
In recent years, courts have had difficulty applying this
broad semantic characterization of educational organizations.
For the first time, in 1980, a circuit court of appeals rejected the
Treasury Regulation definition of "educational" in Big Mama
Rag, Inc. v. United States.45 The case involved a nonprofit or-
ganization that published a monthly feminist newspaper, Big
Mama Rag. Big Mama Rag, Inc. applied for tax-exempt status
as an educational and charitable organization under I.R.C. sec-
tion 501 (c) (3). The district director denied the application be-
43. Treas. Reg. § 1.501 (c) (3)-1 (d) (3). The regulation goes on to give four examples:
(ii) Examples of educational organizations. The following are examples of
organizations which, if they otherwise meet the requirements of this section,
are educational:
Example (1). An organization, such as a primary or secondary school, a
college, or a professional or trade school, which has a regularly scheduled cur-
riculum, a regular faculty, and a regularly enrolled body of students in attend-
ance at a place where the educational activities are regularly carried on.
Example (2). An organization whose activities consist of presenting public
discussion groups, forums, panels, lectures, or other similar programs. Such
programs may be on radio or television.
Example (3). An organization which presents a course of instruction by
means of correspondence or through the utilization of television or radio.
Example (4). Museums, zoos, planetariums, symphony orchestras, and
other similar organizations.
44. See 4 B. BrrrKER, FEDERAL TAXAION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND Gulrs, 100-1,
(1981).
45. 631 F.2d 1030 (D.C. Cir. 1980), rev'g, 494 F. Supp. 473 (D.D.C. 1979).
[Vol. 5
WHAT'S ENTERTAINMENT?
cause the content, preparation and distribution of the
newspaper were not educational in nature. The U.S. District
Court for the District of Columbia held that Big Mama Rag was
not educational in content or manner of preparation, and
therefore failed to comply with the Treasury Regulation defini-
tion of educational organizations entitled to exempt status.46
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
found the definition to be unconstitutionally vague and subjec-
tive. "We find that the definition of 'educational,' and in partic-
ular its 'full and fair exposition' requirement, is so vague as to
violate the First Amendment and to defy our attempts to re-
view its application in this case. 47
Although Big Mama Rag, Inc. challenged the constitutional-
ity of the regulation under both the first" and the fifth amend-
ments, 49 the court reached its decision on first amendment
grounds and thereby avoided discussion of fifth amendment
issues.5 °
The court in Big Mama Rag was concerned that the vague
regulations afforded Internal Revenue Service (IRS) agents
latitude for subjective application of the tax exemption, and
that such treatment could be discriminatory. Citing with ap-
proval the doctrine, first enunciated in Speiser v. Randall,5 '
that the discriminatory denial of tax exemptions may imper-
missibly restrict free speech, the court held that Treasury Reg-
ulation §1.501(c)(3)-l(d)(3) was unconstitutionally vague
under the first amendment.
The analysis of the vagueness doctrine in the opinion pro-
vides insight into the court's perception of adequate and con-
stitutionally permissible definitions. A law will be rendered
46. 494 F. Supp. 473, 481 (D.D.C. 1979).
47. Big Mama Rag, 631 F.2d at 1034-35.
48. "Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech .... U.S.
CONST., amend. I.
49. "No person shall be... deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due pro-
cess of law .. " U.S. CONST., amend. V.
50. Big Mama Rag, 631 F.2d at 1032.
The fifth amendment concerns stem from the same foundations as the first amend-
ment difficulties. A tax statute phrased in an arbitrary and capricious manner forces
the revenue agent to rely upon personal discretion. The application of the exemption
may well vary depending upon the beliefs of the individual agents and the organization
is then left unable to ascertain the qualifications needed to obtain exempt status. This
uncertainty jeopardizes the organization's existence and, if the exemption is rightfully
earned and wrongfully denied, may result in a taking of the organizations' property.
Id.
51. 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
No. 41
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invalid if a person "of common intelligence must necessarily
guess at its meaning"52 or if it does not contain any "terms sus-
ceptible of objective measurement,"53 because such a law
would fail to give notice of its content and meaning. A second
reason for invalidating such a law is that the officials entrusted
with enforcing the law will lack explicit guidelines and may en-
force the law in an arbitrary and discriminatory manner. 4
Given the imprecise and elusive characterization of the term
"educational" in the regulation, it is foreseeable that revenue
agents will be forced to rely on their own individual standards
in granting or denying tax exemptions. As one commentator
noted:
A personal discretion standard is particularly troublesome
when discretion is given to bureaucrats, whose expertise is
financial, to determine the nature and value of an educational
endeavor. These officials may not take the time to consider va-
riety and innovation in education, innovation which might be
acceptable to those truly dedicated to and knowledgeable
about the educative process. Far from avoiding the danger of
tax-subsidized social controversy, the regulation thus permits
IRS agents to influence that controversy by making personal
choices among social philosophies.
55
Where first amendment rights of free speech are at stake,
vague laws are subject to more careful scrutiny: "These stan-
dards are especially stringent, and an even greater degree of
specificity is required, where, as here, the exercise of First
Amendment rights may be chilled by a law of uncertain mean-
ing.''56 After examining the regulation under this greater de-
gree of scrutiny, the court concluded that the Treasury
Department's courageous attempt at defining "educational"
fell afoul of the strict standards required by the first
amendment.
The decision in Big Mama Rag is neither radical nor unwar-
ranted. A vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy deci-
sions to individual agents for resolution on a subjective basis. 57
The trial court itself noted the suspect constitutionality of the
52. Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1926).
53. Cramp v. Board of Public Instruction, 388 U.S. 278 (1961).
54. See supra, note 50.
55. Comment, Tax Exemptions for Educational Institutions: Discretion and Dis-
crimination, 128 U. PA. L REv.849, 866 (1980).
56. Big Mama Rag, 631 F.2d at 1035.
57. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972).
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general definition of the term in the regulation: "The Court re-
jects the government's argument that [Big Mama Rag ] fails to
qualify for tax exemption because it does not instruct the pub-
lic on subjects useful to the community. In the context of the
government's argument, such a standard would be far too sub-
jective in its application to pass constitutional muster. '58
Moreover, while judicial criticism of the entire definition is
fairly recent, legal scholars have long been concerned about
the definition and its possible chilling effect upon educational
institutions. Professor Boris Bittker of Yale University
explains:
The regulations provide that "educational" status is compati-
ble with advocacy of particular positions or viewpoints if the
organization presents "a sufficiently full and fair exposition of
the pertinent facts" to permit the audience to form an in-
dependent opinion, but not "if its principal function is the mere
presentation of unsupported opinion." However satisfying this
distinction may be to the IRS, it raises the hackles of civil liber-
tarians by inviting arbitrary governmental action. The paucity
of rulings and litigated cases does not adequately reflect the
chilling effect on timid educational organizations of the unfor-
tunate fact that unpopular views can be readily denigrated as
"unsupported opinions. 59
Although the regulations are merely interpretations of the In-
ternal Revenue Code and not part of the actual law, they are
frequently awarded "force of law" status by the courts.60 As
long as the regulations are used as grounds for granting or de-
nying tax-exempt status, they should be held to the same high
standards of specificity as the statutes so that the administra-
tion of Internal Revenue Code provisions does not have the ef-
fect of chilling first amendment rights.
Two courts have considered the impact of the decision in Big
Mama Rag on the current validity of Treasury Regulation
§ 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(3). In National Alliance v. United States,61
an organization that espoused white-supremist and anti-Se-
58. 494 F. Supp. at 479, n.6.
59. 4 B. BrrrKER, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME ESTATES AND Givrs, 100-30, (1981).
60. In Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1947), the Court commented in re-
gard to another Treasury Regulation: "As the quoted provision of the Regulations has
been in effect since 1918, and as the relevant statutory provision has been repeatedly
reenacted since then in substantially the same form, the former may itself now be
considered to have the force of law."
61. (19811 STAND. FED. TAX. REP. (CCH) 9464, rev'd 83-2 U.S.T.C. 9434 (D.C. Cir.
1983).
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mitic views in its monthly newspaper was denied tax-exempt
status under the Treasury Regulation definition of "educa-
tional." Relying on the decision in Big Mama Rag, National
Alliance argued that the denial of the tax exemption was un-
lawful in that it was based upon an evaluation of the organiza-
tion under an unconstitutionally vague regulation.2 The
organization contended that the vague regulation encouraged
discriminatory denial of tax exemptions based on the contro-
versial nature of the organization and that the denial of the ex-
emption penalized National Alliance for engaging in free
speech.63
The government recognized the impact of the Big Mama Rag
decision in the case but did not apply it. Instead it proposed
that under a "methodology test," used in place of the unconsti-
tutional regulation, National Alliance should still be denied the
exemption. 4 The proposed methodology test is an adaptation
of the standard used by the IRS before the enactment of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954.65 The test employs four key
factors in determining the educational status of a nonprofit
corporation:
1. Whether or not the presentation of viewpoints unsupported
by a relevant factual basis constitutes a significant portion of
the organization's communications.
2. To the extent viewpoints purport to be supported by a fac-
tual basis, are the facts distorted?
3. Whether or not the organization makes substantial use of
particularly inflammatory and disparaging terms, expressing
conclusions based more on strong emotional feelings than ob-
jective factual evaluations.
4. Whether or not the approach to a subject matter is aimed at
developing an understanding on the part of the addressees, by
reflecting consideration of the extent to which they have prior
background or training.66
The District Court in National Alliance rejected the methodol-
ogy test as a mere rephrasing of the regulation it was intended
to replace.67 The court vacated the IRS's determination that
National Alliance was not entitled to a tax exemption and re-
62. Id. at 87,343.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 87,345.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
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manded the case for further proceedings in light of Big Mama
Rag. 6
8
In contrast to the District Court in National Alliance, the
Tax Court, in Retired Teachers Legal Defense Fund, Inc. ,69 re-
fused to follow the holding in Big Mama Rag, declaring:
Reading the general statements defining "educational" to-
gether with the examples that follow them, we find that the
term "educational" as used in the regulations concerning tax
exempt organizations is not unconstitutionally vague. It does
not appear to us that "men of common intelligence must neces-
sarily guess at its meaning". . . rather, the broader language
of the regulation is clarified by subsequent concrete examples
which provide objective norms to illustrate its meaning.7 °
Aside from its brief reference to the four examples listed in
the regulation, the Tax Court never addressed the issue of sub-
jective application of the regulation, a significant factor in the
Big Mama Rag decision. The fact that the court did not recog-
nize the importance of the ruling in Big Mama Rag indicates a
need for clarification of the entire definition. Furthermore, the
Tax Court opinion did not uphold or condemn that portion of
the decision in Big Mama Ragwhich invalidated the "full and
fair exposition" standard.71 Under the holding in Retired Teach-
ers, the judicial application of Treasury Regulation
§ 1.501(c) (3)-1(d) (3) may be even more subjective and arbi-
trary than was envisioned by the Big Mama Rag court. As a
result, both enforcement officials and entities potentially enti-
tled to the exemption will be unable to determine what stan-
dard to apply.
The Big Mama Rag decision underscores the urgent need for
an objective, precise definition of the term "educational." The
decisions in National Alliance and Retired Teachers illustrate
the current confusion confronting the courts. However, while
it is quite apparent that a new standard is needed to replace
the definition in the Treasury Regulations, no attempt has
been made to develop a different definition. By invalidating
the existing definition of "educational," the court did not in-
68. Id. at 87,346. Motions filed by both parties for clarification of the order were
denied.
Appellate Brief for the United States at 3, National Alliance v. United States and
United States v. National Alliance, Nos. 81-1899 and 81-1900 (1982).
69. 78 T.C. No. 20 (1982).
70. Id.
71. Id.
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tend to open the doors to all nonprofit organizations claiming
to be educational in nature: "We are sympathetic with the
IRS's attempt to safeguard the public fisc by closing revenue
loopholes. And we by no means intend to suggest that tax ex-
empt status must be accorded to every organization claiming
an educational mantle." 2
The court in National Alliance rejected the methodology test
proposed by the government, and did not offer an alternative
definition; instead it simply remanded the case for considera-
tion in light of Big Mama Rag.73 That decision is presently on
appeal before the Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia-the same court which issued the ruling in Big Mama Rag.
Retired Teachers misconstrued Big Mama Rag's analysis and
elected to apply the general definition, but refused to comment
upon the validity of the "full and fair exposition" aspect of the
construction.74
The decision in Big Mama Rag has been criticized for the
court's failure to provide a new definition, or at least more gui-
dance for the development of a more objective standard.75
However, this criticism is inappropriate for it is not the court's
duty to develop regulatory definitions. 76 The task of defining
terms in the Internal Revenue Code is more properly a concern
for Congress or the Treasury Department; neither has yet pro-
posed a new definition.
The sole alternative presented to date is the methodology
test endorsed by the government in National Alliance. In its
appellate brief, the government contended that the District
Court erred in refusing to apply this test.77 It is the govern-
ment's position that the four criteria used in the methodology
test "are as concrete as the statutory standard reasonably per-
mits," and that although the test is susceptible to discretionary
application, administrative and judicial review of agency deci-
sions will adequately resolve any agent errors. If the method-
72. Big Mama Rag, 631 F.2d at 1040.
73. 1981 STAND. FED. TAX. REP. (CCH) 9464.
74. Retired Teachers Defense Fund, 78 T.C. No. 20 (1982).
75. See Winslow & Ash, Effects of the Big Mama Rag decision on exempt educa-
tional organizations: An analysis, 55 J. TAX'N 20, 23 (1981).
76. 'The role of the judiciary in cases of this sort begins and ends with assuring
that the Commissioner's regulations fall within his authority to implement the con-
gressional mandate in some reasonable manner." United States v. Correll, 389 U.S. 299,
307 (1967).
77. National Alliance v. United States, Appellate Brief for the United States, at 12
(1982).
[Vol. 5
WHAT'S ENTERTAINMENT?
ology test is not adopted, the government fears that the IRS
will be forced to approve "as educational per se, the dissemina-
tion of all matter in any manner, and pertaining to any subject
or doctrine whatever.
78
As the District Court in National Alliance correctly con-
cluded, the methodology test suffers from the same problems
as the Treasury Regulation definition. The contention that any
mistake could be corrected by review is easily refuted by the
fact that decisions made under the invalid regulation were also
subject to review. The real trouble with the methodology test
is the subjectivity of the four selected criteria.
The inadequacies of the proposed definitions of "educa-
tional" are readily apparent when they are applied to a hypo-
thetical nonprofit educational play park similar to Sesame
Place. Under either the Treasury Regulation definition or the
methodology test, it is unclear whether the facility would be
considered a tax-exempt educational organization or a non-ed-
ucational, and therefore nontax-exempt, facility.
For example, an educational play park might well be consid-
ered as a facility designed for "[t] he instruction or training of
the individual for the purpose of improving or developing his
capabilities ' 79 or for "[t]he instruction of the public on sub-
jects useful to the individual and beneficial to the commu-
nity."80 The facilities at Sesame Place include components
designed to encourage children to use computers in learning
math, English and logical reasoning; physics experiments and
exhibits to demonstrate elementary elements of physics; and
large play areas designed for children to meet and interact
with other children in the park. The two former components
might well be considered as intended to improve or develop
individual capabilities; while the latter could be seen as in-
struction in a subject useful to the individual and beneficial to
the community. Viewed from this perspective, it seems that
the facility ought to be granted tax-exempt status as an educa-
tional organization; however, if the same elements are ex-
amined from a traditional classroom-oriented perception of
education, it is equally clear that the facility would not qualify
for tax-exempt status as an nonprofit educational organization.
The need for an objective test is obvious. Education, like
78. Id. at 22-23.
79. Treas. Reg. §1.501(c) (3)-1(d) (3) (a).
80. Treas. Reg. §1.501(c) (3)-1(d) (3) (b).
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beauty, lies in the eye of the beholder. A test composed of sev-
eral objective elements extrapolated from relevant case law
would probably satisfy the requirements of the Big Mama Rag
and National Alliance decisions. The test factors selected
should be more objective than those found in Treasury Regula-
tion § 1.501(c) (3)-1(d) (3) and the suggested methodology test.
The test could include the elements discussed in the Swartz
case.8 Such an objective test would produce consistent, equi-
table results.
III
Classifying "Educational" Play Parks
While the continued use of the definition of "educational" in
Treasury Regulation § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(3) seems uncertain in
light of Big Mama Rag and growing judicial concern about its
constitutionality, previous decisions under this definition offer
at least minimal guidance as to which facilities are considered
to be educational in nature. Although the precise issue of an
educational play park has not yet been considered under the
regulation, courts have held that comparable facilities are pri-
marily educational and incidentally custodial for the purpose
of qualifying for the exemption under section 501 (a).82
In one such case, San Francisco Infant School, Inc. v. Com-
missioner,83 a nonprofit day care center provided educational
day care for children between the ages of six months and three
years. The IRS claimed that the nonprofit corporation did not
qualify for tax-exempt status because its services were primar-
ily custodial, or alternatively, that custodial services were a
substantial noneducational purpose of the center. The Tax
Court rejected both arguments and held that the day care
center was primarily educational and entitled to the exemption
provided under section 501(c) (3):84
To qualify for exemption as an organization described in sec-
tion 501(c) (3) petitioner must be operated exclusively for edu-
81. See supra, text accompanying notes 27-33.
82. Michigan Early Childhood Center, Inc. v. Comm'r, 37 T.C.M. 808 (acq. 1978-2
C.B. 2), TC Memo (P-H) 1978-186; San Francisco Infant School, Inc. v. Comm'r, 69 T.C.
957 (acq. 1978-2 C.B. 2); Baltimore Regional Joint Board Health and Welfare, Amalga-
mated Clothing & Textile Workers Union v. Comm'r, 69 T.C. 554, Dec. 34,906.; Rev. Rul.
70-533, 1970-2 C.B. 112; Rev. Rul. 68-166, 1968-1 C.B. 255 superseding O.D. 340 1 C.B. 202
(1919).
83. 69 T.C. 957, (acq. 1978-2 C.B. 2).
84. Id.
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cational purposes. "This plainly means that the presence of a
single noneducational purpose, if substantial in nature, will de-
stroy the exemption regardless of the number or importance of
truly educational purposes" Better Business Bureau v. United
States, 326 U.S. 279, 283 (1945)....
The record establishes that purely custodial care was avail-
able elsewhere....
As its curriculum outlined above demonstrates, all of peti-
tioner's activities are designed "to enhance each child's growth
and learning.,15
If the factors listed by the court in San Francisco Infant
School are considered in reference to an educational play park,
it seems clear the outcome would be the same. Just as the cus-
todial care was an inseparable part of the education provided
by the San Francisco Infant School, so are the educational and
entertaining aspects of a park like Sesame Place intertwined.
Sesame Place's avowed purpose, like that of the day care
center, is "to enhance each child's growth and learning."86 The
stated purpose in constructing Sesame Place was "to design
something that would have solid educational value and en-
tertainment at the same time and Sesame Street was the basic
model. 87 Sesame Place officials claim that "the total environ-
ment (at Sesame Place) creates and enhances the develop-
ment of a child."88
For the day care center, the custodial nature of the program
provided the time and opportunity for the educational purpose.
At an educational play park, the entertainment and amuse-
ment aspects of the facility and its component elements attract
the children and provide the incentive and the opportunity for
them to learn.
A noneducational function which is neither substantial nor
separable from the educational purpose of an operation need
not defeat tax-exempt status. The educational child care
center cases, are thus easily distinguished from cases in which
the purposes are not inseparable, such as in the case of
Schoger Foundation v. Commissioner.9 In Schoger, a non-
profit religious organization owned and operated a mountain
lodge which it characterized as a religious retreat facility. The
85. Id.
86. Middletown v. Sesame Place, Inc., Record at 71.
87. Id. at 328.
88. Id. at 59.
89. 76 T.C. 38 (1981).
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lodge offered optional religious, recreational and social activi-
ties. The court found that the recreational and social purposes
of the foundation were separable from the religious purposes,
and that the former constituted substantial non-exempt activi-
ties sufficient to deny tax-exempt status.90
Finally, the IRS's treatment of fairs under section 501(c) (3)
should be noted. It is the Service's position that the fact that a
fair conducts incidental entertainment and recreational activi-
ties in order to attract the public does not deprive the organiza-
tion of exempt status under Internal Revenue Code section
501(c) (3). 9"
Sesame Place is arguably as educational as a fair, and de-
monstrably more educational in its design. When compared to
the above analogous cases, it is apparent that Sesame Place is
primarily educational, and incidentally an amusement facility.
The difficulty encountered by the trial court in Sesame Place v.
Township of Middletown stemmed from the language of the lo-
cal ordinance and its definition of the term "amusement." In
this instance, as in cases involving Treasury Regulation
§ 1.501(c) (3), there is a clear need for employing objective
standards in the applicable definitions.
IV
Using Objective Standards to Formulate
Definitions
The definitional dilemma examined in the preceding sec-
tions is the result of judicial attempts to adapt inflexible statu-
tory language to unique factual situations.
There are three different approaches, some suggested in the
cases reviewed in this note: (1) a methodology test composed
of objective factors, (2) periodic review of the entity's corpo-
rate charter or by-laws to verify its educational results as well
as its educational purpose, and finally, (3) popular perception
of the facility's educational or amusement value.
The first approach calls for the development of a methodol-
ogy test using objective criteria culled from relevant case law.
The court in National Alliance rejected the government's at-
tempt to use a methodology test because it was no less subjec-
tive than the regulatory definition declared invalid in Big
90. Id.
91. Rev. Rul. 67-216, 1967-2 C.B. 180.
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Mama Rag.92 However, there is no suggestion in the opinion
that a methodology test using objective factors would be sub-
ject to the same objection. The factual standards enunciated in
the Swartz case 93 and those discussed in analogous cases in-
volving nonprofit educational organizations decided under
I.R.C. section 501(c) (3)94 demonstrate that it is possible to ex-
trapolate factually oriented objective standards from relevant
case law to evaluate an organization's primary function. The
four examples found in Treasury Regulation § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)
indicate that the IRS has made limited use of this idea.9" Using
this approach, Sesame Place would be defined as primarily ed-
ucational and only secondarily amusing. The facility is
designed to, and does, offer a unique educational experience
for the park's visitors. The park's guides, school field trip pro-
grams, computers and science exhibits provide objective evi-
dence testifying to the park's educational purpose.
A second approach involves the examination and periodic re-
view of the entity's corporate charter or by-laws. Nonprofit cor-
porations seeking to qualify for exempt status as educational
organizations are required to fully discuss their activities, in-
cluding standards, criteria and procedures used to carry out
these activities.96 A systematic review of the entity's progress
in achieving the goals related to its status as an educational
organization or an amusement facility would result in an objec-
tive evaluation tailored to the entity's own guidelines.
At trial, testimony by experts involved in the organization of
Sesame Place, Inc., revealed that the purpose in designing Ses-
ame Place was to provide a profitable educational experience.
The television show Sesame Street was the model for Sesame
Place, and the park's theme component reflects not only the
familiar characters of Bert and Ernie, Big Bird and Oscar the
Grouch, but also the concept of combining education and en-
tertainment. As Dr. Edward Palmer, Vice President for Chil-
dren's Television Workshop testified:
We were doing this entertainment and learning combination
through television programs and we saw publishing which in-
cluded books and games and toys as a way to extend our edu-
92. 1981 STAND. FED. TAX. REP. (CCH) 9464 at 87,345.
93. See supra, text accompanying notes 27-33.
94. See supra, text accompanying notes 82-91.
95. See supra, note 43.
96. Rev. Proc. 80-25, 1980-1 C.B. 667.
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cational and entertainment function. We saw the play park as
providing another environment, another set of media through
which to extend this work.97
The park's corporate history and projected growth plans evince
the dominant educational emphasis in the facility.
Finally, because people tend to adapt to societal changes
more rapidly than do the courts, it may be appropriate to con-
sider popular perception of original and innovative facilities in
determining whether they are to be classified as educational or
amusement operations for tax purposes.
Despite the hint of truth in the darkly humorous remark that
"[e veryday meanings are of only of secondary importance
when construing the words of a tax statute and are very sel-
dom given any weight when a more abstruse and technical
meaning is available, 98 the United States Supreme Court has
firmly maintained a policy of applying "ordinary, everyday"
meanings to statutory terms. This approach to statutory inter-
pretation is important because the "ordinary, everyday"99
meanings of words, along with popular perception, change with
the passage of time. A large part of one's comprehension of
language comes from experience. As the Court noted in
Helvering v. Horst100: "[c]ommon understanding and experi-
ence are the touchstones for the interpretation of the revenue
laws." 10 1 New definitional approaches to the broad terms "edu-
cational" and "amusement" should incorporate objective stan-
dards which reflect "common understanding and experience."
Such standards should be flexible enough to adapt to new and
varied corporate entities.
Where feasible, the reaction of the public may be used to in-
dicate whether an organization is educational or entertaining
in nature. A survey of visitors to Sesame Place during the
month of October, 1980 revealed that 47 percent of the visitors
to the park rated the educational value of the park as "excel-
lent."'1 2 The large number of school children visiting the park
during school field trips'03 provides further support for the ar-
97. Middletown v. Sesame Place, Inc., Record at 327.
98. Adams, Exploring the Outer Boundaries of the Crane Doctrine: An Imaginary
Supreme Court Opinion, 21 TAx. L. REV. 159, 164 (1966).
99. Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1, 6 (1947).
100. 311 U.S. 112 (1940).
101. Id. at 118.
102. Middletown v. Sesame Place, Inc., Argument Brief for Sesame Place, Inc. at 17.
103. See supra, note 33.
[Vol. 5
WHAT'S ENTERTAINMENT?
gument that the educational play park is primarily educational
in the eye of the public.
The reaction of the mass media to Sesame Place indicates
that it is perceived as primarily educational and only inciden-
tally, although importantly, entertaining. Time magazine ran
an article describing the facility in its "Education" section.
1°4
Articles presented in other publications, including the New
Yorker,'0 Christian Science Monitor,10 6 Wall Street Journal,0 7
New York Times, 10 8 Futurist,10 9 Amusement Business, 110 Wo-
man's Day"' and Geo-World,"2 also emphasize the educa-
104. A Playground for the Brain, TIME MAGAZINE September 21, 1981, at 62. 'The
news at Sesame Place, though, is in the inner sanctum of the Computer Gallery, where
the creators of Sesame Street are perfecting computer software programs that they
expect to sell to the general public. Scores of children sit in communion with batteries
of special computers."
105. U.S. Journal: Langhorne, Pa. - Amusement-Park Thoughts of a Parent along
for the Rides, NEW YORKER, August 24, 1981, at 90, 91. "Because parents know that
children's minds and muscles are stretched by a day at Sesame Place, they can indulge
their children without suffering those twinges of guilt which may sometimes afflict a
parent at a conventional amusement park ......
106. Butwin, Sesame Place: new wave play park for energetic kids, Christian Sci-
ence Monitor, August 19, 1980, at 14.
There are no Ferris wheels, no candy floss, no bearded ladies at this amuse-
ment park. So what's a kid to do? Well, he or she can scale a rope ladder
across a water hazard, challenge a computer that asks you to compose a mel-
ody, and eat in a restaurant that specializes in high-protein morsels including
a nutritious pizza.
107. Kids Get Their Thrills in Megabytes At Theme Park for Computer Age, Wall
Street Journal, June 18, 1981, at 29, col. 1. "[O]ne of the hottest attractions is a room
filled with computers. At $1 for every 12 minutes of computer time, youngsters can use
any of 56 bright-orange Apple terminals to play games, solve puzzles and take tests."
108. Sesame Street Inspires a Park, New York Times, July 31, 1980, §3 (Home) at 1,
col. 1.
At Sesame Place, a new amusement park that opened yesterday here in lower
Bucks County, it seems very natural for children to be conversing with com-
puters, using bicycles to generate electricity for a light show and manually
pumping water to operate giant squirt guns. The naturalness of it all, however,
belies the small but radical difference between this park, where children must
think or work to have fun, and other amusement parks, where such active par-
ticipation is limited.
109. Hellman, Those Incredible New Amusement Parks. A Taste of Thrills to Come,
FuTuRiST, August 1980, 38, 43. "Intended for stays of a few hours rather than a full day,
it will provide for participatory play-in a punchbag forest, for example-and a wide
range of computer games, hands-on science exhibits, and the like."
110. 'Playground of the 21st Century,' Sesame Place opens, Amusement Business,
August, 1980, at 3, col. 2. 'The most unique aspect of the park is the application of
computer technology to provide educational and entertainment activities for patrons."
111. Playground of the Future, WoMAN's DAY, June 16, 1981, at 27. "'All the activi-
ties require participation and effort, either physical or mental.'"
112. Sesame Place, NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC WORLD, May 1982, at 16, 20. "Visitors to
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tional importance of the park.
These popular articles reflect contemporary common under-
standing and experience as applied to an educational play
park. Their opinions reveal that the facility is considered pri-
marily educational rather than amusing in nature under the
standard enunciated by the United States Supreme Court.
The three approaches illustrate some ways in which vague or
overbroad definitions which are susceptible to discretionary
application may be replaced or supplemented by objective
standards. Any new definitional approach developed by legis-
lators or tax authorities should incorporate objective standards
which reflect "common understanding and experience."
V
Conclusion
There is an urgent need for innovative definitional ap-
proaches using objective standards to define the words
"amusement" and "education." This need is clearly seen in
light of the decision in Big Mama Rag and the illustrative ex-
ample of Sesame Place. Such definitions must keep pace with
technological innovations, and should reflect popular percep-
tions of the nature of different organizations.
Legislative bodies and appropriate administrative agencies
at local and national levels must revise outdated, vague or
overbroad statutes to satisfy constitutional free speech and
due process rights. Only when such definitional approaches
are developed will educational organizations and amusement
facilities be secure in trusting the just and equitable applica-
tion and enforcement of taxes and tax exemption. The adop-
tion of definitional approaches using objective criteria will
correct discriminatory application of tax statutes. Such crite-
ria might include those standards suggested previously: objec-
tive factors extrapolated from relevant case law, periodic
review of the corporation's stated intentions and its success in
achieving those goals, and popular perception. The resolution
of definitional difficulties in individual statutes is best left to
the legislative body responsible for the statute's enactment or
an administrative agency; however, the three approaches pro-
posed are examples of possible solutions.
the park learn a lot about how things work-from pumps and pulleys to television and
computers."
[Vol. 5
No. 4] WHAT'S ENTERTAINMENT? 819
The predictable growth of educational play parks similar to
Sesame Place emphasizes the importance of a correct and jus-
tifiable classification of the facility for tax purposes. An evalu-
ation of the design of the park and its actual operation
indicates that the park is indeed a fusion of education and
amusement.
Under the three objective approaches proposed in this note,
it is clear that Sesame Place is primarily educational and only
incidentally an amusement operation for tax purposes.
Let early education be a sort of amusement...
Plato, The Republic
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